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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DIXIES. COX, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MERVYN K. COX, 
Defendant and Cross Appellant 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND REPLY 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO 
DEFENDANT-CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The above entitled matter is a divorce action wherein 
Plaintiff-Appellant, referred to hereinafter as Plaintiff, alleged 
as grounds mental cruelty and asked for the care, custody and 
control of the four minor children born as issue of the parties 
subject to the Defendant having reasonable rights of visitation, 
an equitable division of the property accumulated during the 
marriage, reasonable child support, alimony, reasonable attor-
neys fees and costs of court. The Defendant and Cross Appellant, 
hereinafter referred to as Defendant, filed a Counterclaim seek-
ing divorce alleging as grounds mental cruelty, asking for the 
custody of the minor children, seeking the creation of a Trust for 
the minor children and asking that Plaintiff receive no alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On February 9, 1973 the Lower Court awarded the Defen-
dant a Decree of Divorce from Plaintiff on the grounds of 
Case No. 13242 
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2 
cruelty. After finding both parties capable of having the care 
and custody of the four minor children and expressing some 
concern about the Plaintiffs plans to relocate to the State of 
Idaho, the Court awarded the care and custody of the minor 
children to the Defendant until August, 1973. Thereafter and on 
the 5th day of October, 1973, the Court after full consideration 
of the record awarded the custody of the minor children to the 
Plaintiff subject to reasonable and full visitation rights by the 
Defendant. 
Consistent with granting custody of the minor children to 
the Plaintiff, the Defendant was ordered to pay Plaintiff the 
sum of FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500.00) per month as 
child support. The Lower Court awarded to Plaintiff a property 
and alimony settlement in the total cash amount of $65,000.00, 
which amount was to be reduced to $60,000.00 if paid within six 
months, such sum being subsequently paid. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and Appellant seeks modification of the division of 
property, child support payments and alimony and affirmation 
of the Lower Court's decision regarding child custody. 
Reversal of the Lower Court's decision relative to the care, 
custody and control of the minor children as sought by the 
Defendant-Cross Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The original complaint was filed by the Plaintiff, Dixie S. 
Cox on April 5,1972 and an Amended Complaint was later filed 
on April 10, 1972. 
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The first Answer of the Defendant, Mervyn K. Cox was filed 
on August 9, 1972, and on October 30, 1972 an answer to the 
amended complaint and counter-claim was filed by the Defen-
dant. 
The evidence produced at a trial before the Court on 
January 10, 11, and 12, 1973 produced the following: 
The Plaintiff and Defendant were married on June 16,1961 
in St. George, Utah, there having been born as issue of the 
marriage four minor children. (Tr. 7) 
Following their marriage the parties moved to San Fran-
cisco where Dr. Cox pursued his Dental Program. (Tr. 8, 380) 
During the time of Dr. Cox's attending Dental School the 
Plaintiff was employed in various capacities in an effort to meet 
their living expenses. (Tr. 7,8) Subsequent to the Cox's moving 
back to St. George, Utah in 1964, the Plaintiff worked in the 
Office of the Defendant as a Receptionist and Assistant for a 
period of three years and for a 8 year period subsequent to 1964 
the Plaintiff was employed as a Bookkeeper for the Defendant at 
a salary of $350.00 per month, which amount was deposited in a 
Savings Account and as the Defendant's testimony indicated 
was utilized to purchase the Bentley-Sullivan Farm. (Tr. 
11,12,13,28,121,450451) 
In the factual situation as outlined in the Defendant's Brief, 
there are numerous references to certain relationships with 
male companions; however, as the record clearly indicates, 
there was no testimony elicited which would indicate immoral 
conduct of the Plaintiff in the presence of the children. 
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During the time that Mrs. Cox was continuing her educa-
tion at Dixie College, reference was made to an occasion when 
Dr. Cox found Mrs. Cox with another man in a parked car near 
the College Library. (Tr. 106,390) Upon cross examination, the 
Defendant admitted that they were sitting in the car talking 
and that he observed nothing which would indicate any improp-
riety. (Tr. 431) 
On another occasion testimony was illicited relative to 
another man being in the Cox home clad only in Bermuda 
Shorts. (Tr. 390) The testimony further indicated that the man 
was a Hawaiian who was one of two renters in the Basement 
Apartment and that the renters often ate with the Coxes and 
were apparently welcome in the home. (Tr. 431,432) 
The transcript further reveals a concerted effort by the 
Defendant to attempt to show that Plaintiff had neglected the 
children primarily by leaving them with Babysitters. During 
the month of June, 1972, Plaintiff was absent from the home for 
a ten day period of time. (Tr. 90,122) This ten day period of time 
was a time of sole-searching by mutual agreement of the parties 
to determine whether or not their martial difficulties could be 
settled. (Tr. 89) During this period of time, the Plaintiff kept in 
close touch with several people in an effort to determine the 
problems which the children might be experiencing.(Tr. 89,90) 
Proper arrangements had been made to secure the services of a 
qualified sitter for the children so that they were well cared for 
over that period of time. (Tr. 435) The testimony further indi-
cated that the Plaintiff was particular about whom she selected 
to babysit the children and that she made every effort to insure 
there was adequate food in the house, that the children had 
extra spending money, that they had the names of individuals 
who they could contact for help and that a schedule was pre-
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pared setting forth the respective days and time in regard to the 
schedule of each child. (Tr. 126) 
The evidence proportedly disclosed that during a six month 
period in 1972 Mrs. Cox spent 80 out of 100 days away from the 
children, leaving the children on these occasions with babysit-
ters. (Tr. 301, 313, 322) Upon cross examination, however, the 
witness who disclosed such evidence stated that on many occa-
sions what she in fact termed to be babysitting were in fact 
occasions when the Plaintiffs children were playing with the 
witnesses children and that the babysitting frequently involved 
only short periods of time. (Tr. 285,287,313) This witness 
further testified that the Plaintiff and she were friends, and 
frequently exchanged babysitting services. (Tr. 285) 
Reference is also made to a trip to Boise, Idaho in December 
of 1972 wherein Mrs. Cox stayed overnight with the children in 
a Mobile Home with her boyfriend. (Tr. 101) The seventeen year 
old sister of the Plaintiff accompanied Mrs. Cox to Boise on that 
occasion and there was no testimony which indicated that the 
Plaintiff conducted herself in an improper manner. (Tr. 125) 
Reference is also made to numerous other occasions and Mrs. 
Cox allegedly spent time with the same male companion. (Tr. 
96,98,99,101,114, 267-269) As the record clearly indicates, 
however, the testimony received relative to these occasions did 
not establish that the Plaintiff categorically denied having 
stayed with this same man at the Tri-Arc Travel Lodge in Salt 
Lake City and there was no proof to the contrary. (Tr. 93,94) 
The testimony further indicated that on occasions when this 
same man stayed at her home in St. George, that he stayed in 
the guest room downstairs, such testimony being uncon-
troverted that nothing immoral took place between the parties. 
(Tr. 94) 
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Testimony at the Trial Court revealed tha t the defendant 
had been undergoing psychiatric care, having been diagonized 
as emotionally distressed and depressed and as part of the 
t reatment was placed on a prescribed drug. (Tr. 438) 
The evidence further disclosed that the Defendant expres-
sed an unusal interest in female persons other than his wife. 
(Tr. 438,439,450,452) The Defendant testified tha t on or about 
December 10, 1972 he telephoned London, England ostensibly 
to speak with a former female employee in an effort to ascertain 
whether or not she would provide Defendant with an Affidavit 
as to their relationship. (Tr. 452) On another occasion, the 
Defendant in the absence of his wife proceeded to teach the 
Plaintiffs Sister, then 15V2 years of age how to dance and pro-
ceeded to dance in such a manner to cause her to become uncom-
fortable and request to be taken home. (Tr. 454) The testimony 
further indicated that rather than taking her directly home, the 
Defendant parked the automobile and proceeded to kiss the 
young lady. (Tr. 455) 
The evidence discloses that the older children have on occa-
sion inquired as to "why's Daddy treating us so mean," and tha t 
the Defendant has further upset the children in removing them 
from school during their reading period. (Tr. 30,31) Further 
testimony clearly established that the Plaintiff takes great in-
terest in her children, in taking the children hiking and picnic-
ing, participating in numerous other events with the children, 
and a s s i s t i ng t h e m in t h e i r r e a d i n g and s tud ies . (Tr. 
234,235,240) In fact, the Plaintiff was rather insistent that any 
plans she might have had would have to wait until she finished 
reading to the children and they finished with their studies. The 
witness who provided this testimony visited the Cox home at a 
frequency of approximately 2 or 3 times per week and testified 
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the house to be clean, the children well dressed and the meals 
balanced and nutritious. (Tr. 240,241) 
The testimony of the Home Teacher indicated that the 
interior of the Cox Home, particularly the living room and 
kitchen were very clean on numerous occasions when he visited 
the Cox Home, including two occasions when he arrived unan-
nounced. (Tr. 457,458) He further testified that the children 
were clean and well dressed and that there appeared to be 
harmony and love between Mrs. Cox and the children. (Tr. 458) 
The evidence adduced at the trial court level established 
that the parties have accumulated since their marriage the 
following described real and personal property: 
1. The Home located in St. George, Utah, having a value of as 
established by the Esplin Appraisal Service in the sum of 
$74,500.00, with approximately $500.00 due for improve-
ments on said home at the time of the trial. (Tr. 161,403) This 
value was arrived at utilizing the market data approach, 
together with the replacement cost less depreciation and by 
comparison to comparable sales. (Tr. 151,152,155,156,157, 
159, 161) 
That the market date and comparable sales approach was 
also utilized in determining the value of the Bentley-Sullivan 
Farm which the Esplin Appraisal Service valued at 
$104,420.00. (Tr. 161-165) According to testimony given by the 
Defendant, there was an indebtedness of $22,000.00 owing on 
the Bentley portion of the Farm and $16,000.00 owing on the 
Sullivan portion of the Farm leaving a net value of $66,420.00. 
(Tr. 407,408) 
Utilizing the comparable sales approach, the Syphus Farm 
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was appraised at a vlue of $181,000.00. (Tr. 166-169) The origi-
nal purchase price of the property was $120,000.00, the parties 
owning an undivided one-third (1/3) interest therein. (Tr. 405) 
The Defendant testified that there was an encumbrance against 
the property in the amount of $104,000.00, the net equity in-
terest of the parties based on one-third of the net equity of 
$77,000.00 being in the sum of $25,600.00. 
By Stipulation of the parties it was determined that the 
one-third interest of the parties in the Car Wash Property had a 
value of $9,730.00. (Tr. 147,148) The parties further stipulated 
that the property referred to as the Service Station and Business 
Building Complex located at Kemp Corners had a value based 
on the Esplin Appraisal Report of $62,398.00. Counsel for the 
respective parties stipulated that the encumbrance due on the 
Kemp Corners Property was in the sum of $31,897.00, leaving a 
net value of $30,502.00 of which the parties own a one-half (1/2) 
interest valued at $15,251.00. (Tr. 210,404) Counsel for the 
respective parties stipulated as to the value of the Pine Valley 
Property at $3,200.00 and Kolob lots at $6,000.00. (Tr. 148) 
The Defendant testified that the value of the parties one-
seventh (1/7) equity interest in the Prince Medical Complex was 
in the sum of $10,000.00. (Tr. 411) The Defendant also testified 
as to the value of the 1972 Chevrolet Stationwagon in the 
amount of $4,500.00, the 1970 Buick Riveria Automobile in the 
amount of $2,000.00, the 1969 Ford Pickup in the sum of 
$1,500.00, the Boat and Trailer in the sum of $1,800.00, the 
one-fourth (XA) interest in an Airplane in the sum of $2,400.00, 
the 2 Snow Mobiles together with trailer in the sum of 
$1,000.00, the Trackster in the sum of $1,000.00, a Promissory 
Note from Howard Carter with an unpaid balance of $20,000.00 
at 5% interest per annum, a Promissory Note from John Whit-
ney with an unpaid balance of $30,000.00 with interest thereon 
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at the rate of 5% per annum, a Convertible Bond in the sum of 
$8,000.00, U & I Sugar Stock in the sum of $200.00, American 
Western Life Insurance Stock valued at $600.00, Freedom Hold-
ing Company Stock the value of which was unknown, a mem-
bership in the Bloomington Country Club having a value of 
$300.00, Dental Equipment situated within the Defendant's 
Office having a value of $6,000.00 and a Savings Account in the 
St. George Savings and Loan in the amount of $2,300.00. (Tr. 
410-415) 
Taking into consideration the respective values established 
by the evidence and stipulation of Counsel less the respective 
encumbrances, the property accumulated by the parties during 
the period of their marriage has a value of $292,101.00. 
There was additional testimony concerning the 
Defendant's participation in a Keogh Retirement Plan; how-
ever, there does not appear any estimate as to the accrued value 
of the Plan at the time of the filing of the Complaint. (Tr. 27) 
The uncontroverted testimony of the Plaintiff established 
that she and her children need approximately $1,019.00 per 
month to maintain the standard of living to which they have 
been accustomed. (Tr. 26,27) The testimony elicited in the 
Lower Court indicated that the Defendant, an Orthodontist, has 
a substantial annual income together with the properties set 
forth herein having substantial income producing qualities. 
(Tr. 21,25,354,356,357,358,359) 
Subsequent to the trial, counsel for the respective parties, 
at the Trial Courts request, submitted Memorandums of Points 
and Authorities. On February 9, 1973, the Trial Court having 
some concern in regard to the propriety and judgment of some of 
the actions concerning a male companion of the Plaintiff and the 
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position that he placed the Plaintiff in, the Court awarded the 
temporary care, custody and control of the minor children of the 
parties to the Defendant and Counter-Claimant until the month 
of August, 1973. As the Court indicated the Plaintiff had tes-
tified as to her intention and desire to vacate Washington 
County and move to Boise, Idaho for the purposes of marrying 
the man as soon as such marriage might be legally possible. As a 
result thereof, the Court expressed concern about taking the 
minor children from Washington County in the immediate fu-
ture and introducing them into a new home, Mrs. Cox having 
testified it was her intention to marry this man. (February 9, 
1973; (Tr. 4,5) The Court further found that Mrs. Dixie Cox was 
a fit Mother; however, it was the desire of the Court to give her 
an opportunity to stabalize her life during the interim period of 
time, having in mind the presumption under Utah Law that the 
Mother is presumed to be the custodian of the children in the 
best interest of the children. (February 9,1973; 3,5) The Court 
further ordered a property and alimony settlement payable to 
the Plaintiff, by the Defendant in the amount of $65,000.00, 
such amount to be secured by a First Lien on the Home belong-
ing to the parties and provided that the property settlement and 
alimony payment was effected within six months it was to be 
reduced by $5,000.00, resulting in a $60,000.00 cash settlement. 
(February 9,1973 Tr. 6) In addition, the Plaintiff was awarded 
the 1972 Stationwagon Automobile, together with her personal 
belongings and Defendant was ordered to pay Plaintiff the sum 
of $2,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and costs of court. 
(Februaiy 9, 1973; Tr. 7) 
The Court further required that the Defendant pay Plain-
tiff the sum of $1,000.00 per month for a period of six months to 
assist Plaintiff in relocating to Idaho. (February 9,1973; Tr. 6) 
The total sum of $6,000.00 was subsequently paid and on Feb-
ruary 18,1974 the balance of $54,000.00 paid by the Defendant 
to the Plaintiff was ordered placed in escrow by the Clerk of the 
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District Court pending appeal of the property settlement. 
Following the consideration by the Lower Court of the 
Plaintiffs Motion for an in-kind distribution to Plaintiff of the 
assets of the parties in regard to awarding the Carter and 
Whitney Promissory Note proceeds and the Bentley-Sullivan 
Farm to Plaintiff, which testimony indicated was adjacent to a 
farm owned by the Plaintiffs Father (Tr. 443) and considera-
tion of Plaintiffs and Defendants recapitulation on values of 
property holdings and Plaintiffs objections to the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Interlocutory Decree of Divorce 
in regard to the Trial court's lump sum alimony and property 
award, the trial court on the 14th day of December issued a 
Memorandum Decision affirming the property settlement as set 
forth by the Court in its ruling of February 9,1973. Without the 
benefit of a transcript, the Lower Court found the net assets of 
the parties subject to division and distribution to be in the sum 
of $209,743.00, which the Court rounded off to $210,000.00. 
(Mem. Dec. 2) The Court divided that sum by one-third which 
amounted to $62,762.76, awarding to Plaintiff a net property 
and alimony settlement of $65,000.00 together with the 1972 
Station Wagon having an agreed value of $4,500.00 making a 
total award of $69,500.00. (Mem. Dec. 2) The Court further 
stated that in the event the Defendant elected to pay the cash 
award over a 10 year period at 7% interest per annum consistent 
with the previous Court Order entered on February 9,1973, the 
value to Plaintiff would be approximately $90,540.00. (Mem. 
Dec. 3) 
After referring to factors considered by the Court in making 
the property settlement award, the lower Court utilizing the 
recapitulation of assets submitted by the Plaintiff indicated 
that one-third of $290,000.00 would be in the sum of $87,087.00, 
which amount the trial court felt must be discounted by a 
maximum of one-fourth or a minimum of one-fifth. (Mem. Dec. 
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4) Discounting $87,087.00 by one-fourth the Court calculated 
the present day award or equity to be $65,135.00 and discount-
ing $87,087.00 by the minimum of one-fifth the trial court 
determined the present day equity to be $69,670.00, both 
amounts which the trial court felt to be comparable to the 
$69,500.00 award made by the Court. (Mem. Dec. 4) 
The Decree of Divorce was entered on December 24, 1973, 
the divorce having become final on that date pursuant to an 
order of the trial court made on October 5, 1973, neither party 
having appealed the granting the divorce. (October 5,1974; 27) 
A Notice of Cross-Appeal was filed by the Defendant Mer-
vyn K. Cox on January 21, 1974. The Plaintiff filed a Notice of 
Appeal January 22, 1974. 
ISSUES. 
The issue presented in the Cross-Appeal concerns whether 
the trial court erred in granting the care, custody and control of 
the minor children to the Plaintiff— Mother, together with the 
attendant of the award of child support. 
The issue raised on the Appeal by Plaintiff concerns 
whether the Lower Court erred in its ruling regarding the lump 
sum alimony and property settlement award. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN 
TO THEIR MOTHER. 
In divorce cases the trial court has considerable discretion 
in determing what is equitable, and, upon appeal, the decision of 
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the court as to child custody will not be reversed unless it is clear 
that there was an abuse of discretion. Graziano v. Graziano, 7 
Utah 2d 187, 321 P. 2d 931, (1958); Sartain v. Sartain, 15 Utah 
2d 198,389 P.2d 1023 (1964); Sampsell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73,202 
P.2d 550, (1949). The reason most often expressed for this rule is 
that the trial court is in an advantaged position to observe the 
witnesses and draw conclusions. As was said in Sampsell v. 
Holt, at 202 P.2d 554: 
rrWe are not disposed to upset that finding. The trial court 
had the opportunity, as we do not, of seeing the parties and 
the witnesses, of observing their demeanor, and of forming 
opinions." 
Therefore, unless it can be shown that the mother is unfit, it 
is proper to leave the children in her custody. 
A. The preferences in Utah is for children of tender years to 
remain with their mother. 
The Court has often expressed the philosophy that children 
of a young age are better left under the mother's care than the 
father's. The Court has said that, all things being equal, the 
mother is in an advantaged position over the father when it 
comes to child custody. McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d 393, 
384 P.2d 961 (1963); Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273,293 P.2d 
418, (1956);Briggs w.Briggs, 111 Utah 488,181 P.2d 223 (1947). 
Unless the mother is demonstrated unfit to be a mother, this 
preference exists. 
B. The Plaintiff has not been shown to be unfit as a mother. 
Several cases, both in Utah and elsewhere, have reached 
the conclusion that to be a good mother one need not be a good 
wife. 
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In Ryan v. Ryan, 17 Utah 2d 44, 404 P.2d 247 (1965), it is 
t rue that the Court upheld an award to the father. However, it 
was doing this in observance of the rule that , unless abuse of 
discretion is shown, the ruling of the trial court will not be upset 
on appeal. Although the evidence did show the wife had been 
engaged in love affairs, was continually away from home, and 
failed to care for the children, the Court did not deem this 
conduct immoral. At 404 P.2d 248, it said: 
"While the evidence contained in the record before us does 
not seem to warrant the court's findings that the Plaintiff 
(wife) is an immoral person, he nevertheless had the parties 
before him, witnessed their dismeanor and could reason-
ably conclude that plaintiff was not a fit or proper person to 
have custody of the children. . . . While some other judge 
may have found otherwise we cannot say that the trial court 
acted unreasonably or abused its discretion." 
It is clear that the Court's decision was based on observance 
of the rule stated above. This is even more clear when it is 
remembered tha t in Ryan the father had been convicted of two 
serious felonies, and the Court wondered who cared for the 
children while he was in prison. 
The proposition tha t one can be a good mother but a poor 
wife was expressed in Dearden v. Dearden, 15 Utah 2d 105, 388 
P.2d 230, (1964). The Supreme Court in Dearden, without dis-
turbing the District Court finding of adulterous conduct by the 
mother and the finding tha t she was frequently absent from 
home and in the company of other men, concluded tha t this did 
not exhibit any base, depraved or erratic att i tude toward the 
child and refused to grant custody of the child to the father. In 
the case ofStuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650, (1952), 
the mother was living with a married man at the time of the 
trial. There, also, the Court upheld the award of custody of the 
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children to the mother. On the basis ofDearden and Stuber, the 
Court affirmed the decree granting custody of the children to 
the mother in the case of Sparks v. Sparks, 29 Utah 2d 263, 508 
P.2d 531, (1973). In that case, the mother was living with 
another man, to whom she was not married, while she had 
custody of the children from her former marriage. 
Even more forcefully in support of this position that a good 
mother can be a poor wife are cases where the mother's adultery 
is not merely suspected but actually proven. In Cooke v. Cooke, 
67 Utah 371, 248 p 83, (1926), the wife was adjudged guilty of 
adultery by a Canadian Court. The Utah Supreme Court said 
that, though the Canadian decision as to adultery was to receive 
full faith and credit, it did not deprive the mother of custody of 
the children. At 248 P 102 it said: 
rrIn this country the general rule is that a spouse, though 
found or adjudged guilty of adultery, will not, for such 
reason, necessarily be deprived of the care and custody of 
his or her children." 
Further, it was said that the unfitness which deprives a parent 
of custody must be positive, not contemplative or comparative. 
Our sister state of Nevada has expressly held that adultery will 
not disqualify the mother in custody matters. In Cooley v. 
Cooley, 86 Nev. 220, 467 P.2d 103, (1970), the Nevada court 
upheld an award of custody to the mother, even though she had 
lived with her paramour for a month, during which time the 
children, ages 8 and 10, were present in the home. In so ruling, 
the Court expressly overruled Sisson v. Sisson, 77 Nev. 478,367 
P.2d 98, (1961), where the Court had reversed the trial court's 
award of child custody to the mother under similar circum-
stances. In footnote 2 of Cooley, it was said: 
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rr2. We expressly overrule any views in Sisson, supra, which 
may be inconsistent with those herein." 
In Chase v. Chase, 15 Utah 2d 81, 387 P.2d 556 (1963) the 
District Court ordered the custody of a 2^2 year old boy previ-
ously granted to the mother to be granted to the father. In 
reversing the award of custody to the father the Supreme Court 
stated: 
"Except for understandable human frailties, practically her 
only dereliction of consequence which might directly affect 
the child is that of leaving him with Plaintiffs mother, or in 
a nursing home, while she worked. This is not necessarily 
inimical to his welfare" Id. at 556. 
The Court further stated: 
rlt is a universally recognized principle, well grounded in 
reason and experience, that a child of such tender years 
should be in the care of his mother unless there is some 
substantial and compelling reason to deprive her of cus-
tody" Id at 556. 
The evidence in this case clearly does not demonstrate any 
substantial or compelling reason to deprive Mrs. Cox of custody 
of the children. The evidence has disclosed tha t Mrs. Cox has 
always taken great interest in the children and participated in 
numerous activities with them, including among others, hik-
ing, picnicing, cooking and assisting them in their reading and 
studies. (Tr. 234,235,240) The evidence further indicated Mrs. 
Cox to keep the house clean, the children well dressed and serve 
well balanced and nutritious meals. (Tr. 146,147,240,241,457, 
458) 
The record clearly indicates the total lack of any conclusive 
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evidence demonstrating any immoral conduct on the part of the 
Plaintiff in the presence of the children. 
Reference has been made to the numerous occasions when 
the children were left with babysitters, The testimony clearly 
indicates that on most occasions they were left with babysitters 
for only a short period of time, many times of babysitting being 
in reali ty only playt ime with the neighbor children. (Tr. 
285,287,313) Reference was further made to a 10 day period, 
which by agreement of the parties was a period of soul search-
ing. (Tr. 89) The Plaintiff, contrary to the representations of the 
Defendant, kept in close touch with several people over that 
period of time to ascertain how the children were. At no time 
was it demonstrated tha t the Plaintiff was negligent in select-
ing babysitters to care for the children. On the contrary, the 
Plaintiff made every effort to insure there was adequate food in 
the house, that the children had extra spending money, that 
they had the names of persons who they could contact for help 
and that a schedule for each child was prepared to assist the 
babysitter. (Tr. 126) It is significant tha t during the 9 month 
period between the filing of the divorce and the trial tha t the 
Father did not institute any proceedings to secure temporary 
custody and was apparently satisfied that the children were 
being well cared for. 
Many of the cases cited by the Defendant are distinquish-
able from the facts of the case at bar. In Francks v. Francks, 21 
Utah 2d 180,442 P.2d 937 (1968) the evidence demonstrated the 
Mother to have traveled about the streets late at night in an 
intoxicated condition and that the 11 year old child of the par-
ties during the trial requested that his custody be awarded to his 
Father. Such a factual situation does not appear in this case. In 
McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d 393, 384 P.2d 961 (1963) the 
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evidence indicated the Mother to use unseemly language in the 
presence of the children, to keep obscene materials within the 
reach of the children, leaving home on numerous occasions 
arriving home late and in an intoxicated condition, spending an 
inordinate amount of time in Taverns and persistently refusing 
and neglecting to engage in activities with the children. In the 
instant case such conduct on the part of the Mother clearly does 
not appear in the record. In Hyde v. Hyde, 22 Utah 2d. 429, 454 
P.2d 884 (1969) the mother was proven emotionally unstable 
and prior to the divorce left a baby 13 months old, purportedly 
for a two week vacation, failing to return until a five and one 
half month period had elapsed. The facts in the case at bar 
present no similiarity to the Hyde case. 
SUMMARY 
While as the trial court stated it may be true that some of 
Mrs. Coxes actions may be lacking in propriety and judgment, 
the cases are clear that that situation, or even outright adul-
tery, will not render the mother unfit to have the custody of her 
children. The cases are unanimous in proclaiming that unless 
such unfitness is shown, or an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court manifested, the Court will not reverse the lower court's 
ruling on appeal. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the trial 
court be affirmed and that the custody of the four minor children 
remain with their Mother, who as the evidence indicates is a fit 
and proper person to have their care, custody and control. 
POINT II. 
THE PROPERTY AND ALIMONY SETTLEMENT 
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RENDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS UNJUST AND 
INEQUITABLE. 
It is well settled that, as property division decisions are 
equitable proceedings, upon appeal the Supreme Court may 
review both law and facts. Constitution of Utah, art. 8, par. 9, 
Dahlberg v.Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214, (1930); Steed v. 
Steed, 54 Utah 244, 181 P 445, (1919); Clawson v. Wallace, 16 
Utah 300, 52 P 9, (1898). 
A. The wife is generally entitled to one-third of the prop-
erty. 
In Griffen v. Griff en, 18 Utah 98, 55 P 84, (1898), the Court 
expressed the general rule that, upon divorce, the wife takes 
one-third of the property of the marriage. However, this is not 
an absolute rule; it depends, in each case, on the particular facts 
and the equities of the situation. For example, in Woolley v. 
Woolley, 113 Utah 391, 195 P.2d 743, (1948), the wife was 
awarded about one-third of the property, but she was not given 
any part of some mining interest which her husband owned. The 
Court found this to be error because it denied her the right to 
share in the possible increase in the stock's value. Therefore, the 
Court ordered the trial court to keep continuing jurisdiction in 
order to increase the award in the event the stock went up. 
Where the wife has contributed to the marriage in substan-
tial part, she is entitled to more than one-third. In Lundgreen v. 
Lundgreen, 112 Utah 31, 184 P.2d 670, (1947), the husband 
purchased a home for $395.00. The wife spent part of her funds, 
and a considerable amount of time, in remodelling and decorat-
ing the house. The trial court granted the wife the furniture, 
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some of which she had owned prior to the marriage, and some of 
which they had accumulated after the marriage. The Court 
found this to be error, saying she should have been given one-
half the value of the house in excess of $395.00. If, in addition to 
contributing to the marriage, the wife's earning ability has not 
increased while the husband's has, the wife may be entitled to as 
much as 80%. In Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 483,211 P.2d 
452, (1949), the Court found no error in an award to the wife of 
$1,651.00 out of $2,057.00. The Court noted that the wife had 
been employed throughout the marriage while the husband had 
attended school, and his earning ability had been substantially 
increased while hers, at best, had remained the same. A similar 
case isPinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255,67 P.2d 265, (1937). There, 
after a marriage of only four years, the wife was given 
$2,000.00, one-half the total $4,000.00 the couple owned. It was 
noted that she had been a store clerk prior to the marriage, but 
had given up her job, and any hopes of advancement, upon 
marriage. 
B. The purpose in dividing property is to permit the parties 
to reconstruct their lives. 
It was said in Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977, 
(1955), that the purpose in property division is to permit recon-
struction of lives. Except in marriages of extremely short dura-
tion, where neither's economic position has been substantially 
altered, this does not mean placing the parties as they were 
before marriage. In Wilson, the husband and wife had been 
married for 15 years, during which time the husband earned 
between $80.00 and $300.00 per month, but always enough to 
keep them comfortable. The Court affirmed an award to the wife 
of the house, valued at $19,000.00 to $20,000.00, with a 
$9,352.74 mortgage; a second home valued between $4,000.00 
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and $5,000.00; stock worth $545.90; a joint bank account of 
$827.39; and a tax check of $161.10. It said that the wife was 
entitled to some compensation for her 15 years of service to her 
husband. InBullen v.Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 P 292, (1928), the 
husband had inherited $25,000.00 in property from his father, 
which, at the time of the divorce was subject to $5,000.00 in 
debts. Even though the wife had contributed nothing in the way 
of accumulating the property, she was awarded $2,250.00, and 
the husband was directed to pay $3,150.00 in notes jointly 
signed by both. 
Since the purpose of property division is to reconstruct 
lives, the question to be answered in determining if the division 
was sufficient is not can the parties sustain themselves, but can 
they maintain themselves in the manner to which they are 
accustomed.Ring v.Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155 (1973). 
In that case, during the marriage both the husband and wife 
were employed as practicing physicians. The husband earned 
about $29,000.00 per year in private practice, while she earned 
$7,000.00 with the public health department. Upon divorce, she 
was granted alimony of $600.00 per month and child support of 
$200.00 per month. She then moved to San Francisco, where she 
began to earn about $26,000.00 per year. The trial court then 
reduced the alimony to $1.00 per year. The Supreme Court 
reversed, saying that much of her new earnings were likely 
eaten up by increased expenses, and, though she could very 
easily survive, her lifestyle would not be that to which she had 
become accustomed. 
In divorce cases, the wife is entitled to at least one-third of 
the property, as a rule of thumb. This is increased depending on 
the circumstances, especially if the wife has contributed to the 
accumulation of property, or had her earning ability impaired 
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by the marriage. Even if she has done neither, she may be 
entitled to more as compensation for her years of service. 
In Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P.2d 928, (1968), 
the Court awarded the wife one-half of the accumulated assets. 
In Weaver, similar to the case presented here, the Defendant 
was a physician specializing in Urology and from his practice 
and by careful management accumulated assets of approxi-
mately $250,000.00. Largely through the growth of stock an 
additional asset accumulation of $500,000.00 resulted. A large 
portion of the stock was acquired by the husband by purchasing 
or as gifts from his father and sister. The Supreme Court subse-
quently upheld an equal division of the assets. 
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 14 Utah 2d. 24, 376 P.2d 547 
(1963), the Supreme Court upheld a trial court award of a half 
interest in a home of the parties, the rental property, a substan-
tial life insurance policy on the husband, a country club mem-
bership and some personal property. In addition to a one-half 
interest in the above mentioned property, the husband was 
ordered to pay $1,250.00 per month alimony to the wife, not-
withstanding that all of the children had reached the age of 
majority and that never during the marriage had the wife been 
a breadwinner. In upholding the decision of the District Court, 
the Supreme Court stated: 
rrIt is apparent from the Court's distribution of the property 
that the husband was left with the wherewithal to continue 
producing a substantial sum of money and also substantial 
interests in real and personal property were allowed to be 
retained by him, so that it does not appear he will be greatly 
hindered in the mode of living to which he has accustomed 
himself The wife has been given some income producing 
property, as well as alimony, so that she can continue living 
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in the style to which she has become accustomed during the 
marriage. Under such circumstances, this Court cannot say 
that there has been a plain course of discretion or that the 
awards are unjust or inequitable/' Id at 548. 
The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions indicated 
tha t consideration must be given to all of the at tendant facts 
and circumstances including: the duration of the marriage; the 
ages of the parties; their social positions and respective stan-
dards of living; considerations relative to the children; the 
money and property possessed by the parties and its manner of 
acquisition; the t raining and capabilities of the respective par-
ties and their present and potential incomes. Wilson v. Wilson, 5 
Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956); Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 
67 P.2d 265 (1937); Allen v. Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165 P. 2d 872 
(1946). The facts in the present case indicate that the parties have 
accumulated since their marriage assets aggregating a value of 
$292,101.00. (Tr. 147, 148, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 159, 
161-165,166-169,210, 404,405,411, 410-415) In reviewing the 
Memorandum Decision issued by the Trial Court, we note tha t 
the Trial Judge indicated that he did not have the benefit of a 
transcript in arriving at the value of $210,000.00. The record 
clearly indicates that the value of the assets accumulated by the 
parties totals $292,101.00. Based upon the Trial Court's deter-
mination tha t the Plaintiff was entitled to an alimony and 
property settlement of one-third, the net property settlement 
due to the Plaintiff would be in the sum of $97,367.00. The Trial 
Court, in its Memorandum Decision of December 14, 1973, 
indicated tha t dividing $290,000.00 by one-third as Plaintiffs 
share would be $87,087.00. (Mem. Dec. 4) The Trial Court's 
determination as to a one-third value of $290,000.00 appears to 
be in error, one-third of $290,000.00 being in the sum of 
$96,667.00. The Trial Court further indicated tha t the one-third 
figure must be discounted by a maximum of one-fourth or by a 
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minimum of one-fifth (Mem. Dec. 4) Discounting the one-third 
by the maximum figure, Plaintiffs present day equity would be 
$72,500.00 or discounting the one-third figure by the minimum 
figure of one-fifth, Plaintiffs award would be $77,334.00. We 
can find no case authority purporting the propriety of reducing 
the equity figures by the maximum or minimum amounts cited 
in the trial court's Memorandum Decision. Assuming the prop-
erties were ordered sold or awarded in-kind consistent with 
Plaintiffs Motion for an in-kind Distribution, the Plaintiffs 
present day equity would be substantially near the figure of 
$96,667.00. 
The record fully substantiates the contribution of the 
Plaintiff relative to the accumulated assets of the parties. The 
Plaintiff worked on a full time basis in various capacities in an 
effort to defray living expenses while Dr. Cox attended Dental 
School. (Tr. 7,8) Subsequent to the Coxes moving to St. George in 
1964, Mrs. Cox worked in the office of Dr. Cox as a Receptionist 
and Assistant for a period of three years, for an eight year period 
subsequent to 1964, Mrs. Cox was employed as a Bookkeeper for 
the Defendant, MervynK. Cox, at a salary of $350.00 per month, 
which amount was deposited in a Savings Account and as the 
Defendant's testimony indicated was utilized to purchase the 
Bentley-Sullivan Farm, having a net value of $66,420.00. (Tr. 
11,12, 13, 28, 121, 407, 408, 450, 451) The testimony further 
indicated that the Bentley-Sullivan Farm is adjacent to a Farm 
owned by the Plaintiffs Family, which would have been condu-
cive to an in-kind distribution of the assets by the Trial Court. 
(Tr. 443) Inasmuch as the salary of the Plaintiff was utilized to 
acquire the Bentley-Sullivan Farm, it would appear reasonable 
tha t the Trial Court should have awarded an in-kind distribu-
tion of the assets, including the Carter and Whitney Promissory 
Notes which could be utilized in retiring the encumbrances 
remaining to be paid on the Bentley-Sullivan Farm. 
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The evidence clearly indicates that the Defendant has a 
substantial income producing ability. The parties had a taxable 
income of $21,837.00 in 1969, $25,465.00 in 1970 and 
$17,869.07 in 1971. (Tr. 356,357,358) 
As the Supreme Court has reiterated in numerous deci-
sions, the primary purpose of a property division is to recon-
struct lives, the question to be analyzed in determining the 
sufficiency of a property division being not whether the parties 
can sustain themselves, but can they maintain themselves in 
the manner to which they are accustomed. The uncontroverted 
testimony of the Plaintiff established that she and her children 
need approximately $1,019.00 per month to maintain the stan-
dard of living to which they have been accustomed. (Tr. 26, 27) 
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, it is difficult to 
understand how the Plaintiff can continue to maintain that 
standard of living on a child support allowance of $500.00 per 
month and a cash alimony and property settlement in the 
amount of $60,000.00. As the Court indicated in the Ring Case 
much of the wife's new earnings were likely to be eaten up by 
increased expenses. In these inflationary times, it is not difficult 
to foresee that the costs and expenses of supporting and main-
taining a standard of living to which the Plaintiff and her 
children have been accustomed will necessitate an invasion into 
the cash alimony and property settlement awarded by the Trial 
Court. 
The Defendant, on the other hand, should have little diffi-
culty in maintaining the standard of living to which he has been 
accustomed. As the evidence clearly indicates, he possesses 
substantial income producing ability and pursuant to the award 
made by the Trial Court has substantial interest in other real 
and personal properties, including the Carter and Whitney 
Promissory Notes aggregating receivables in the amount of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
$50,000.00 plus interest. The testimony further indicates the 
real propert ies , including the Kemp Corners Proper t ies , 
Apartment in the home, Farm Properties and Car Wash Prop-
erty, to have substantial income producing capabilities. The 
lump sum alimony and property settlement award to Plaintiff 
has little income producing ability, save and except investment 
interest thereon which will provide little hedge against in-
flationary expenses. 
SUMMARY 
Depending on the circumstances, particularly such as those 
in the instant case where the wife has contributed to the ac-
cumulation of property or had her earning ability impaired, the 
Court has been inclined to award an equal division of the ac-
cumulated assets. 
We respectfully submit tha t the Judgment of the Lower 
Court regarding the lump sum alimony and property settlement 
be reversed and modified to the extent tha t Plaintiff receive the 
Bentley-Sullivan Farm Property together with the Carter and 
Whitney Promissory Notes which can be utilized to pay the 
respective encumbrances, the 1972 Chevrolet Station Wagon 
and such additional cash award as in the Courts Judgment will 
approximate an equal division of the aggregate net cash value of 
the accumulated assets of the parties and to the extent tha t the 
Defendant receive the home located in St. George, Utah, the 
Syphus Farm, the one-third equity interest of the parties in the 
Car Wash Property, the Kemp Corners Property including the 
service station and building complex located thereon, the Kolob 
and Pine Valley Lots, the one-seventh equity interest of the 
parties in the Prince Medical Complex, the Buick Automobile, 
the Ford Pickup, the Boat and Trailer, the one-fourth interest in 
the Airplane, the 2 Snowmobiles and Trackster, the Convertible 
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Bond, the U & I Sugar Stock, the American Western Life Insur-
ance Stock, the Freedom Holding Company Stock, the 
Bloomington Country Club Membership, the Dental Equip-
ment and the Savings Account in the St. George Savings & 
Loan. 
Respectfully Submitted 
CLINE JACKSON & MAYER 
Joseph E. Jackson 
Attorney's for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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